Tolay, National Narratives, Migrations, Anatolia
Juliette Tolay
The other important concept at stake when understanding the constructed nature of the nation is the idea of a historical national narrative and the control over the memory of the past, so as to either ‘protect’ or ‘create’ a certain idea of the nation. History plays indeed a central role in the idea of nation, not only because of the precedents that it documents, but also because of the central role that history plays discursively in defining a common identity. Studies of nation and nationalism have highlighted how the construction of nations was predicated on framing particular events in the past in a way that will highlight, if not create, the glorious past of a particular group (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983). Historical events and figures become a symbol and references of ‘who we are.’ So while history can never be fully objective, the subjectivity of national history is particularly strong. In Gellner’s words: ‘The cultural shreds and patches used by nationalism are often arbitrary historical inventions.[ ... ] The cultures [nationalism] claims to defend and revive are often its own inventions, or are modified out of all recognition’ (Gellner, 1983, p. 56). National historical narratives involve processes of voicing and silencing particular events, in a way that truly makes history a ‘social construction,’ constrained only partially by the academic knowledge of what we know about this history (Berger, Donovan, & Passmore, 2002). This intentional process of construction of a national narrative is one that reflects more the politics of the present than our knowledge of the past: ‘To write the story of the nation demands that we articulate that archaic ambivalence that informs modernity’ (Bhabha, 1990, p. 294)...
Turkish historiography offers a particularly interesting example of such a construction of a ‘Turkish’ identity through inclusion and exclusion of particular events (Çağaptay, 2006). There was no self-perceived ‘Turkish nation’ before the nineteenth century. The broader intentional and unintentional process of creating a Turkish identity started indeed with the late Ottoman empire, and the emergence of reformist and nationalist groups in the Empire (such as the Young Ottomans in the last nineteenth century or the Young Turks in the early twentieth century). Eventually, it peaked as the raison d’être of the Turkish Republic after 1923, when it was taken to a more radical, comprehensive and concrete level with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s creation of a ‘Turkish state’ as a home of the ‘Turkish nation’ (Karpat, 2001).
Mustafa Kemal’s government engaged in an intentional and large-scale project of writing history. In 1932, the First Turkish History Congress was convened and the ‘Main themes of Turkish History’ were presented, heavily relying on the ‘Turkish History Thesis.’ The Turkish history thesis
contended that the Turks were a great and ancient race [...]. In Central Asia, they had created a bright civilization around an inner sea. [...] When the inner sea dried up due to climatic changes, the Turks left their original home and moved in all directions to civilize the rest of the world. They went to China to the East; to India to the South; and to Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, Anatolia, Greece, and Italy to the West. (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 51)
[T]his formative period succeeded in creating a vision of the history of Turkey that had to go back before the Ottoman Empire onto the Central Asian origins of the Turkish people. In Turkey, talking about ‘our history’ means talking about the ‘history of the Turkish people, moving from Central Asia to Anatolia,’ as opposed to a history of Turkey’s territory, which would include the history of Anatolia before the first Turkic tribes arrived around the turn of the first-millennium CE and the broader history of the populations with which these Turkic tribes mixed when they settled into Anatolia (Greeks, Armenians, Assyrians, Arabs, Kurds, etc.). This vision, in turn, would give a prominent place to some historical migrations, but not to others. ...
[I] conducted semi-structured interviews with Turkish citizens between 2008 and 2013, to gauge the level of knowledge regarding immigration into Turkey. During the interviews, it became clear that respondents were aware of a number of migratory experiences in Turkish history, but were not about others, or rather that others were not conceived as a migratory experience. When appropriate, this information is triangulated with .. a quick analytical overview of the official Turkish history curriculum in primary and secondary education.
During the interviews, respondents generally affirmed that migration has always played an important role in Turkish history. More specifically, three migratory experiences came up regularly during the interviews: (1) Turkish people have always been mobile, as nomadism is their original way of life (roughly referring to Turk’s Central Asian past), (2) Turkish people have welcomed many migrants and accommodated the ensuing diversity (roughly referring to the Ottoman Empire) and (3) Turkish people have also become migrants and exiles themselves (roughly referring to the twentieth century).
According to respondents, the first experience with migration and mobility that characterizes Turkish history is one that assumes a fundamental relationship with mobility, having been a nomadic people who have been on the move for centuries. Examples of such statements are:
The direction of Turkey for thousands of years has always been to move towards the West. We came from Central Asia to Vienna’s door, and now onto Western Europe and soon Brussels.
We came from Central Asia a thousand year ago. We come from a geography of migrations. This is who we are.
From a cultural perspective. Because of the migrations in Central Asia, you know, migration is something normal for us.
And indeed, as was mentioned earlier, under the influence of the ‘Turkish History Thesis,’ Turkish students were taught about early pre-historical, Neolithic migrations of the Turkish people, who had earlier created and dispatched civilization to the four corners of the world. ... [this] overall image of early great Turkish migrations became engrained in the Turkish consciousness: ‘This is a history deeply conscious of its Asian origins, of its peregrination, and which continuously expresses its intention to settle in Anatolia’ (my translation, Copeaux, 1997, p. 230). The current social science and history curriculum in primary and secondary education indicates that Turkish migrations from Central Asia are covered pervasively in 6th, 9th and again in 11th grade, with an emphasis on both the nomadic way of life and culture of the Turkic population, and the migration routes they took up through Eurasia.
As was mentioned above, the creation of the idea of Turkish nation has made extensive use of history as a means to instil a feeling of uniqueness and commonality as a member of the Turkish nation. However, there exist as well alternative narratives about this history, both at home and abroad, especially among Turkey’s ethnic minorities (such as among Greek, Armenian, Kurd and Assyrian citizens of Turkey) who do not necessarily share the idea of ‘Central Asian origins.’ But even these existing ‘minority’ narratives are not the only ones that can be found in the wealth of historical knowledge available about the history of Anatolia...
The history of migration and settlement in Anatolia—or Asia Minor —before the arrival of Turks .. is a history of rich and breath-taking civilizations occupying this strategically centred piece of land situated between the Aegean, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and opened on the East to Mesopotamia and the broader Eurasian continent ...
And indeed, the Anatolia found by the first Turkish nomads was already a formidable centre of cultural diversity. According to Hoerder:
Asia Minor, Hellenized under Greek rule and Christianized by Byzantine emperors, had been the scene of both manifold involuntary population transfers and voluntary migrations involving numerous peoples: Christian refugees from Arab lands; Greek Cypriots; demobilized soldiers of Frankish, Russian, English, Norman, German, Bulgaric, Saracen, or Albanian background; as well as Kurdish, Georgian, Syrian and Armenian peoples. ...
The Persian dominance in Anatolia until Alexander the Great’s conquests in 380 BCE had a great impact on the political structure of the area (satrap system), but did not fundamentally alter the overwhelmingly Hellenic culture of Anatolia. In spring 334 BCE, Alexander crossed the Dardanelles and undertook the conquest of Anatolia (Strassler, Romm, Mensch, & Cartledge, 2010, pp. 2–54). A number of Hellenistic kingdoms (Pergamum, Lycia, Bithynia, Galatia, Pontus, Cappadocia) succeeded to the Empire of Alexander the Great, with the Greek Seleucid Empire dominating most of Anatolia. In the east, the Armenian kingdom was established reaching the Caspian, Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea (Mossé et al., 2005). ...
There seems to be [various] explanations to why specific migratory experiences have been included or excluded in Turkey national narrative. One is about the ‘homogeneity’ requirement of nationalist discourses: nationalism is typically conceived around a single identity and a single ancestor. In many European nation-states, the national narrative tends to ignore or undermine the role played by past migrations as a source of diversity. In contrast, in the case of Turkey, the single, ‘homogenous’ ancestor is constructed as the migrant, the Central Asian nomad that came to Anatolia, and who seemingly did not mix with local population; hence, the need to reject pre-Turkish Anatolian migrations as not being part of Turkey’s history
Turkish people tend to be proud of their experiences as migrants and as hosts of immigrants (Tolay, 2014). However, such normative appreciation of the history of Turks and migration is also based on a truncated view of history, that tends to ignore or silence narratives emphasizing negative experience with migration, such as the history of forced migration over the last millennium of Turkish history. The history of migrations outlined above offers a glimpse into what an alternative, more comprehensive, national narrative could look like. What is troubling about the current truncated national narrative is that it ignores a rich history of migration that does not refer to negative experience, and could be a source of pride: pre-Turk Anatolian migrations tell a formidable history of humanity that connects today’s population of Turkey (including self-perceived ethnic Turks who are likely to be of mix origins) to a succession of successful civilizations and enriching migrations. Recasting Turkey’s history by affirming that Turkey today is the [marginal] descendant of both the history of Turkic tribes from Central Asia and people who had immigrated to Anatolia before them could be a great opportunity to reconcile the diverse identities of Turkey today, while claiming the glorious past of some the oldest and greatest civilizations.
On the other hand, rehabilitating the history of forced migration, because of its negative connotation, is somewhat more problematic, albeit more essential. There are indeed many arguments showing how the continuous denial of past violence is harmful and counter-productive. Not only does such denial silences, disempowers and denies closure to populations that are victim of such (forced) migrations, but it also has a deep negative impact on the broader population. Göçek, using Giesen and Zerabuvel, shows how denial of collective violence also creates a trauma for the perpetrating society, as it distorts the relationship to reality, challenges notions of ethics and morality and normalizes violence in the society. Hence, from denial of collective violence stems autocratic tendencies and lack of democracy (Göçek, 2015). ‘Only when we understand and come to terms with such collective violence embedded in all of our pasts can we create a better future for our descendants’ (Göçek, 2015, p. 478). Accordingly, recognizing a violent past can be significantly rewarding. Being sober, modest, self-critical, and eventually true-to-one’s values, is indeed a great feature to gain and showcase. Germany is typically used as a successful example of a country that has gained reputation and a healthier relationship with democracy through its recognition of guilt (Olick, 2007). In addition, recognizing that the victims are an integral part of the nation (by recognizing their history as well) can also help mitigate the recognition of past violence, by seeing the nation as being simultaneously perpetrator and victim.
References
Anderson, B. R. O. G. (1991). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London: Verso
Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Berger, S., Donovan, M., & Passmore, K. (2002). Writing national histories Western Europe since 1800. London: Routledge.
Bhabha, H. K. (1990). DissemiNation: Time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation. In H. K. Bhabha (Ed.), Nation and narration. London: Routledge.
Çağaptay, S. (2006). Islam, secularism, and nationalism in modern Turkey who is a Turk? London: Routledge.
Karpat, K. H. (2001). The politicization of Islam: Reconstructing identity, state, faith, and community in the late Ottoman state. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strassler, R. B., Romm, J., Mensch, P., & Cartledge, P. (2010). The landmark Arrian’s campaigns of Alexander. Anchor Books.
Mossé, C., Azoulai, M., Baslez, M.-F., & Blanchon, F. (2005). Une histoire du monde antique. Paris: Larousse.
Tolay, J. (2014). Deconstructing Turkish public attitudes towards refugees: Empowering rights over politicization and self-gratification. USAK Yearbook of Political and International Relations, 6, 1–29.
Göçek, F. M. (2011). Genocide: Turkish historiography on 1915. In R. G. Suny, F. M. Göçek, & N. M. Naimark (Eds.), A question of genocide: Armenians and Turks at the end of the Ottoman empire (pp. 42–52). New York: Oxford University Press.
Copeaux, E. (1997). Espaces et temps de la nation turque: Analyse d’une historiographie nationaliste, 1931-1993. Paris: CNRS Éditions. Danış , D. A. (2010).
Olick, J. K. (2007). The politics of regret: On collective memory and historical responsibility. New York, NY: Routledge.